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The US Federal Reserve cut interest rates more vigorously in the recent recession than the European
Central Bank did. By comparison with the Fed, the ECB followed a more measured course of action.
We use an estimated dynamic general equilibrium model with financial frictions to show that comparisons
based on such simple metrics as the variance of policy rates are misleading. We find that - because
there is greater inertia in the ECB's policy rule - the ECB's policy actions actually had a greater stabilizing
effect than did those of the Fed. As a consequence, a potentially severe recession turned out to be only
a slowdown, and inflation never departed from levels consistent with the ECB's quantitative definition
of price stability. Other factors that account for the different economic outcomes in the Euro Area
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Massimo.Rostagno@ecb.int1 Introduction
It is sometimes tempting to establish comparisons across central banks’ policies over the cy-
cle on the basis of the extent to which they move their instruments in a fraction of time. A
central bank that moves its policy rate around abruptly would under this measure be viewed
as very responsive to the state of the economy. Instead, a central bank which follows an ob-
servationally more moderate path would qualify as "passive" and unresponsive. In this paper
we use a medium-scale dynamic general equilibrium model with ﬁnancial frictions to show
that comparisons based on such simple metrics are misleading. Comparative assessments of
monetary policies cannot abstract from a careful analysis of the shocks and the underlying
economic structures that shape the macroeconomic landscape which central banks face.
We concentrate on the most recent international downturn, after 2001, in the US and the
Euro Area (EA, henceforth). We use estimated versions of our model on US and, respectively,
EA data and we reach three conclusions. First, a central bank that moves its policy rate
sharply in response to each twist and turn in the data would have only a limited impact
on economic activity. This is because policy shifts that lack persistence have little impact
on longer-term interest rates.1 According to our estimates ECB policy is characterized by
greater persistence than Fed policy is. As a result, to achieve a given economic eﬀect the ECB
must move its policy rate by much less than the Fed must. This is why we ﬁnd that interest
rate actions by the ECB had a greater stabilizing eﬀect on output than the Fed interest
rate actions did, even though the latter were bigger. The slowdown in economic activity
after 2000 in the EA was so mild that it technically does not even meet the deﬁnition of a
recession (see log, per capita real GDP in the EA and the US in Figure 1).2 We estimate
that, had it not been for the supportive monetary policy shocks implemented by the ECB,
the EA growth slowdown after 2000 would instead have been a substantial recession.
A second ﬁnding is that the US and EA were hit by diﬀerent shocks. For example,
it is true that the Fed’s response to the 2001 recession was very aggressive. Indeed, we
ﬁnd that the Fed’s reaction was greater than what one would have predicted on the basis
of its past behavior in recessions. It is true that the ECB did not spring into action at
t h es a m et i m ea n dw i t ht h es a m ea b r u p t n e s sa st h eF e d . B u t ,t h a ti sb e c a u s et h es h o c k s
that produced the EA recession did not occur until later (see Figure 1b). When the bad
shocks that produced the EA slowdown ﬁnally did strike one year later, the ECB reacted
by deviating from past patterns. The ECB continued to keep rates low longer than the Fed
did, because unfavourable shocks lingered longer in the EA than in the US (see Figure 1).
T h eE C Bw a sa b l et op r o v i d es u p p o r tt oe c o n o m i ca c t i v i t y ,w i t h o u tv i o l a t i n gi t sd e ﬁnition
of price stability (see Figure 1).
1This principle has been analyzed extensively by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), and
Woodford (1999,2003).
2We never see two consecutive quarters of negative growth.
2A third factor also helps to account for the diﬀerences between the US and the EA. Our
estimates indicate that wages and prices are more ﬂe x i b l ei nt h eU St h a ni nt h eE A .I ft h eE A
were instead characterized by the same price ﬂexibility as the US, inﬂa t i o ni nt h eE Aw o u l d
have exhibited more of the volatility evident in the US data (see Figure 1). This volatility
would have increased the volatility in the ECB’s policy rate, causing the movements in the
EA interest rate to more closely resemble those in the US. At the same time, we ﬁnd that
diﬀerences in wage and price ﬂexibility do relatively little to explain the diﬀerences in real
output between the EA and the US, according to our estimates.
In order to quantify the macroeconomic outcome of a diﬀerent and more activist policy
in the EA, we conduct a simple test. We simulated the post 2000 period in the EA, replacing
the ECB monetary policy rule by the Fed’s policy rule. To our initial surprise, we found
that inﬂation would have been substantially higher and output would have been lower in the
EA, if the ECB had adopted the Fed’s monetary policy.3
Our analysis requires disentangling the components of the data due to shocks, structure
and monetary policy.4 The formal tools we use are designed to do this. We use models
that have been estimated using EA and US data in Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2007).
The estimation exercise provides us with estimates of the shocks driving the two economies,
as well as parameter values for their economic structures and monetary policy rules. Our
analysis is based on simulations of our EA model under various counterfactual scenarios.
These simulations allow us to investigate how the EA economy would have evolved if it had
been struck by the US shocks, or if it were characterized by the US wage/price ﬂexibility, or
if it had adopted US monetary policy.
The models we use must be fairly elaborate if the results of our simulations are to be
credible. For example, we want to include standard shocks such as disturbances to technol-
3It is useful to diﬀerentiate the question we study from an alternative question: “what
would have happened if the Fed had been in charge of the ECB?” Because the US and
EA economies have somewhat diﬀerent structures and shocks, it is possible that if the
Fed were literally in charge of the ECB, it might not have applied the same monetary
policy strategy that it uses in the US. To answer the alternative question would require
identifying the Fed’s objective function and then computing the monetary policy rule that
optimizes it, conditional on the economy corresponding to the estimated EA economy.
The question of what the Fed would have done, had it been in charge of the ECB, would
be answered by simulating our EA model economy with the optimized policy rule. We did
not do this. When we investigate what the Fed would have done, had it been in charge of
t h eE C B ,w es i m u l a t et h em o n e t a r yp o l i c yr u l et h a tw ee s t i m a t e dt h eF e dt oh a v eu s e di n
the US.
4A similar exercise is conducted in Sahuc and Smets (2007). They also ﬁnd that
diﬀerences in shocks were important in determining the diﬀerent economic outcomes in
the two areas, while they ﬁnd that diﬀerences in the nature of monetary policy and in the
degree of nominal rigidities in the two areas did not matter.
3ogy, government consumption, household preferences and monetary policy. In addition, the
substantial volatility observed in ﬁnancial markets in recent times suggests that it is impor-
tant to allow for the possibility that ﬁnancial factors play an important role in dynamics.
Thus, we allow for the possibility that ﬁnancial markets are a source of shocks, and for the
possibility that ﬁnancial markets play an important role in the propagation of non-ﬁnancial
market shocks. Our estimated models are a variant of one we used to understand another
period when ﬁnancial market volatility played an important role, the US Great Depression
(see, Christiano, Motto and Rostagno, 2003). This model builds on the basic structure of
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) by incorporating sticky wages and prices, adjust-
ment costs in investment, habit persistence in preferences and variable capital utilization.
Regarding ﬁnancial markets, the model integrates the neoclassical banking model of Chari,
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995). In addition, the model integrates the model of ﬁnancing
frictions built by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). Finally, our analysis proceeds in
the spirit of Smets and Wouters (2003) and others by using Bayesian methods for model
estimation and for evaluation of model ﬁt.
In this paper we provide an overview of the model, followed by our analysis.5
2 The Model
We describe the model structure in this section, as well as the shocks. The model is composed
of households, ﬁrms, capital producers, entrepreneurs, banks and a monetary authority. At
the beginning of the period, households supply labor and entrepreneurs supply capital to
homogeneous factor markets. In addition, households divide their high-powered money into
currency and bank deposits. Currency pays no interest, and is held for the transactions
services it generates. All transactions services are modeled by placing the associated mone-
tary asset in the utility function. Bank deposits pay interest and also generate transactions
services. Banks use household deposits to fund working capital loans to ﬁrms. Firms use
working capital to pay the wage bill and rent on capital. Firms and banks use labor and
capital to produce output and transactions services, respectively.
The output produced by ﬁrms is converted into consumption goods, investment goods
and goods used up in capital utilization. Capital producers combine investment goods with
used capital purchased from entrepreneurs to produce new capital. This new capital is then
purchased by entrepreneurs, using a combination of their own net worth and loans from
banks. Agency costs introduce ﬁnancial frictions into the entrepreneur-bank relationship.
Banks obtain the funds to lend to entrepreneurs by issuing two types of liabilities to house-
holds.
5The details of the estimation results for our model are reported in a separate paper
(Christiano, Motto and Rostagno, 2007).
4The monetary authority conducts monetary policy according to a standard Taylor rule.
It is able to do this, because it controls the quantity of high-powered money.
2.1 Goods Production
We adopt the standard Dixit-Stiglitz framework for ﬁnal goods production. Final output,
Yt, is produced by a perfectly competitive, representative ﬁrm. It does so by combining a








, 1 ≤ λf,t < ∞, (1)
where Yjt denotes the time-t input of intermediate good j and λf,t is a shock. The time
series representations of this and all other stochastic processes in the model will be discussed
below. Let Pt and Pjt denote the time-t price of the consumption good and intermediate
good j, respectively. The ﬁrm chooses Yjt and Yt to maximize proﬁts, taking prices as given.
We assume that ﬁnal output can be converted into consumption goods one-for-one. One
unit of ﬁnal output can be converted into μΥ,tΥt investment goods, where Υ > 1 is the trend
rate of investment-speciﬁc technical change, and μΥ,t is a stationary stochastic process. Be-
cause ﬁrms that produce consumption and investment goods using ﬁnal output are assumed
to be perfectly competitive, the date t equilibrium price of consumption and investment
















, 0 <α<1, (2)
where Φz∗
t is a ﬁxed cost and Kjt and ljt denote the services of capital and homogeneous






1−αt), Υ > 1, (3)
where the growth rate of z∗
t corresponds to the growth rate of output in steady state. We
suppose that ﬁxed costs grow at this rate to ensure that they remain relevant along the
equilibrium growth path, and to be consistent with balanced growth.
In (2), the persistent shock to technology, zt, has the following time series representation:
zt = μz,tzt−1,
5where μz,t is a stochastic process. The variable,  t, is a stationary shock to technology.
The homogeneous labor employed by ﬁrms in (2) and the diﬀerentiated labor supplied








, 1 ≤ λw. (4)
Below, we discuss how ht,i is determined.
Intermediate-goods ﬁrms are competitive in factor markets, where they confront a rental
rate, Pt˜ rk
t, on capital services and a wage rate, Wt, on labor services. Each of these is
expressed in units of money. Also, each ﬁrm must ﬁnance a fraction, ψk, of its capital
services expenses in advance. Similarly, it must ﬁnance a fraction, ψl, of its labor services in
advance. The gross rate of interest it faces for this type of working-capital loan is Rt.
We adopt a variant of Calvo sticky prices. In each period, t, a fraction of intermediate-
goods ﬁrms, 1 −ξp, can reoptimize their price. If the ith ﬁrm in period t cannot reoptimize,










where ι1 controls the degree of indexation to the monetary authority’s inﬂation target, π
target
t ,
which we discuss below. Initially, we also included steady state inﬂation in (5), in a way
that preserved linear homogeneity. However, the value of the power on steady state inﬂation
went to a corner of zero during estimation on both the EA and US data, and so we simply
impose this estimation result here in the description of the model. The ith ﬁrm that can















Here, λt+j is the multiplier on ﬁrm proﬁts in the household’s budget constraint. Also, Pi,t+j,
j>0 denotes the price of a ﬁrm that sets Pi,t = ˜ Pt and does not reoptimize between
t +1 ,...,t+ j.
2.2 Capital Producers
At the end of period t, capital producers purchase investment goods, It, a n di n s t a l l e dp h y s i c a l
capital, x, that has been used in period t. Capital producers use these inputs to produce new
installed capital, x0, that can be used starting period t+1. In producing capital goods, capital
6producers face adjustment costs. In our baseline speciﬁcation, these costs are expressed in
terms of It/It−1 :
x
0 = x +
¡
1 − S(ζi,t It/It−1)
¢
It.
Here, S is a function with the property that in steady state, S = S0 =0 , and S00 > 0.
Also, ζi,t is a shock to the marginal eﬃciency of investment. Since the marginal rate of
transformation from previously installed capital (after it has depreciated by 1 − δ) to new
capital is unity, the price of new and used capital is the same, and we denote this by Q ¯ K0,t.
The ﬁrm’s time-t proﬁts are:
Π
k

























where Et is the expectation conditional on the time-t information set, which includes all
time-t shocks.
Let ¯ Kt+j denote the beginning-of-time t+j physical stock of capital in the economy, and
let δ denote the depreciation parameter. From the capital producer’s problem it is evident
that any value of xt+j whatsoever is proﬁt maximizing. Thus, setting xt+j =( 1− δ) ¯ Kt+j is
consistent with proﬁt maximization and market clearing. The aggregate stock of physical
capital evolves as follows
¯ Kt+1 =( 1− δ) ¯ Kt +
¡




The situation of the entrepreneur is depicted in Figure 2. At the end of period t, the en-
trepreneur uses his net worth, Nt+1, plus a loan from a bank to purchase the new, installed
physical capital, ¯ Kt+1, from capital producers. The entrepreneur then experiences an idio-
syncratic productivity shock: the purchased capital, ¯ Kt+1, becomes ¯ Kt+1ω, where ω is a unit
mean, lognormally distributed random variable across all entrepreneurs. The object, logω
has a variance of σ2
t, where the t subscript indicates that σt is itself the realization of a
random variable. The random variable, ω, is drawn independently across entrepreneurs and
over time from a cumulative distribution function which we denote by F.I np e r i o dt +1 ,
after observing the period t +1shocks, the entrepreneur determines the utilization rate of
capital, and then rents it out in competitive markets at nominal rental rate, Pt+1˜ rk
t+1.I n






where a is an increasing and convex function, and τoil
t+1 is a shock which we identify with
the real price of oil. After determining the utilization rate of capital and earning rent (net
of utilization costs) on it, the entrepreneur sells the undepreciated part of its capital to the











Pt+1 +( 1− δ)Q ¯ K0,t+1 + τkδQ ¯ K0,t
Q ¯ K0,t
,
where τk is the tax rate on capital income. After this, entrepreneurs settle their bank
loans. Entrepreneurs with a large enough ω (bigger than a variable we denote by ¯ ωt)p a y
interest, Zt+1, on their bank loan. Entrepreneurs who declare that ω<¯ ωt cannot fully
repay their bank loan are monitored, and they must turn over everything they have to
the bank. The monitoring cost to the bank is a proportion, μ, of the entrepreneur’s total
gross revenues. The interest rate, Zt+1, and loan amount to entrepreneurs are determined
as in a standard debt contract. In particular, the loan amount and interest rate maximize
the entrepreneur’s expected state at the end of the loan contract, subject to a zero proﬁt
condition on the bank. The bank’s zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o nr e ﬂects the assumption that there
is perfect competition in banking.6 The zero proﬁt condition leads to a straightforward
deﬁnition of the external ﬁnance premium faced by entrepreneurs. Zero proﬁts means that
banks’ revenues from entrepreneurs exactly equals bank expenses. Banks incur two expenses
in intermediating between households and entrepreneurs: the interest on banks’ cost of
funds from households, plus banks’ expenses on monitoring costs. We deﬁne the latter as
the external ﬁnance premium.
After the entrepreneur has settled his debt with the bank in period t+1, and his capital
has been sold to capital producers, the entrepreneur’s period t+1net worth is determined.
At this point, the entrepreneur exits the economy with probability 1−γt+1, and survives to
continue another period with probability γt+1. The probability, γt+1, is the realization of a
stochastic process.
Each period, new entrepreneurs are born in suﬃcient numbers so that the population of
entrepreneurs remains constant. New entrepreneurs born in period t+1receive a transfer of
net worth, We
t+1. Because We
t+1 is relatively small, this birth and death process helps to ensure
that entrepreneurs do not accumulate so much net worth, that they become independent of
banks. Entrepreneurs selected to exit consume a fraction, Θ, of their net worth, Vt, in the
6In addition the zero proﬁt condition also reﬂects the assumption that banks do not
have access to complete, state-contingent markets.
8period that they are selected to exit the economy. The complementary fraction of Vt is
transferred in the form of a lump-sum payment to households.7
We interpret the random variable, γt, as a reduced form way to capture an ‘asset price
bubble’ or ‘irrational exuberance’. In informal discussions these phrases are often used to
refer to changes in stock market wealth that are not clearly linked to shifts in preferences or
technology. This is literally the case in our model when γt jumps. The random variable, σt,
is a way to capture the notion that the riskiness of entrepreneurs’ activities varies over time.
The details of our model of entrepreneurs follows the speciﬁcation in Christiano, Motto
and Rostagno (2003). With one exception, that model is taken from Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist (1999). The exception has to do with restriction that the return received by
households is nominally non-state contingent. This nominal restriction allows the model to
articulate Fisher’s (1933) “debt deﬂation” hypothesis. According to this, when there is an
unexpected drop in the price level, the total real resources transferred from entrepreneurs to
households is increased. Another diﬀerence with Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) is
that we specify idiosyncratic uncertainty, σt, and the entrepreneur’s wealth shock, γt, to be
random variables.
2.4 Banking
There is a representative, competitive bank. The bank intermediates loans between house-
holds and ﬁrms, and it produces transaction services using capital, labor and reserves.
In period t, banks make working capital loans, Sw
t , to intermediate goods producers and




t = ψlWtlt + ψkPt˜ r
k
tKt.
Here, ψl and ψk are the fraction of the wage and capital rental bills, respectively, that must
be ﬁnanced in advance. Note that these apply to all homogeneous labor, lt, and capital
services, Kt, reﬂecting our assumption that both intermediate goods producing ﬁrms and
banks must ﬁnance their period t variable input costs at the beginning of period t. The funds
for working capital loans are obtained by issuing demand deposit liabilities to households.
In period t, banks make loans to entrepreneurs, Bt+1, to purchase capital. Banks obtain
funds for these types of loans by issuing two types of liabilities to households - savings
deposits, Dm
t+1, and time deposits, Tt - subject to:
D
m
t+1 + Tt ≥ Bt+1. (7)
7There are two objects we call ‘net worth’ in this section, Nt+1 and Vt. The former
is the average net worth of entrepreneurs in period t after a fraction of entrepreneurs is
selected to leave and after all transfers have been received. The object, Vt, is the period t
average net worth of all entrepreneurs who were present in period t − 1.
9Household savings deposits pay interest, Rm
t+1, in period t+1and also generate some trans-
actions services. Time deposits generate interest, RT
t+1, in period t +1but they provide no
transactions services.
Our model has implications for various monetary aggregates: currency, M1 (currency plus
demand deposits), M3 (M1 plus savings deposits), high powered money (currency plus bank
reserves) and bank reserves. The reason we assume banks ﬁnance loans to entrepreneurs by
i s s u i n gt w ot y p e so fl i a b i l i t i e sr a t h e rt h a no n e ,i st h a tt h i sa l l o w su st om a t c ht h eo b s e r v e d
velocity of M3.8 If banks only issued one type of liability, and this liability were included in
M3, then the velocity of M3 would be counterfactually low. This is because, as in the data,
the quantity of debt to entrepreneurs is high in our model.
In period t+1the bank earns a return, Re
t+1, on Bt+1. It passes this on to households in
the form of interest,R T
t+1, on Tt and interest, Rm
t+1, on Dm
t+1 (see Figure 3). For the reasons
indicated in the previous subsection, we suppose that Re
t+1 is a function of information
available at and before period t only. We suppose the same is true of RT
t+1 and Rm
t+1.
Following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), we suppose that banks in period t do not
have access to period t +1 -contingent markets. As a result, they face the following ‘no
blood from stone’ constraint, which states that payments made to households cannot exceed





















The maturity period of loans to entrepreneurs coincides with the maturity period of
household savings and time deposits. The loans are issued at the time new, installed capital
is sold after the goods market closes and they are repaid at the same time next period. The
timing of entrepreneurial lending activity and the associated liabilities is illustrated in Figure
4.
To ﬁnance working capital loans, Sw
t , the bank issues demand deposit liabilities, Dh
t , to
households. These liabilities are issued in exchange for receiving At units of high-powered
money from the households, so that
D
h
t = At. (9)
Working capital loans are made in the form of demand deposits, D
f












8In Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2003), banks ﬁnance entrepreneurial loans with
only one type of liability.
10Demand deposits pay interest, Ra
t. We suppose that the interest on demand deposits that
are created when ﬁrms and banks receive working capital loans are paid to the recipient
of the loans. Firms and banks hold these demand deposits until the wage bill is paid in a
settlement period that occurs after the goods market.
Interest paid by ﬁrms on working capital loans is Rt + Ra
t. Since ﬁrms receive interest
payments on deposits, net interest on working capital loans is Rt. The maturity period of
time t working capital loans to ﬁrms and banks and the maturity period of demand deposits
coincide. A period t working capital loan is extended just prior to production in period t,
a n dt h e np a i do ﬀ after production. The household deposits funds into the bank just prior
to production in period t and then liquidates the deposit after production (see Figure 4).
Demand and savings deposits are associated with transactions services. The bank has a
technology for converting homogeneous labor, lb
t, capital services, Kb
t, and excess reserves,
Er





















, 0 <ξ<1. (12)
Here ab and ς are positive scalars, and 0 <α<1.A l s o , xb
t is a unit-mean technology
shock that is speciﬁc to the banking sector. We include excess reserves as an input to the
production of demand deposit services as a reduced form way to capture the precautionary
motive of a bank concerned about the possibility of unexpected withdrawals. Excess reserves
are deﬁned as follows:
E
r
t = At + Ft − τDt, (13)
where τ denotes required reserves. Here, Ft represents reserves borrowed from other banks
on an interbank loan market. In the market, a bank can augment its reserves by borrowing





Ft. Since all the banks are
identical, we will have Ft =0in equilibrium. Our purpose in introducing this market is to
be in a position to deﬁne the rate of interest on interbank loans.
At the end of the goods market, the bank settles claims for transactions that occurred in
the goods market and that arose from its activities in the previous period’s entrepreneurial
loan and time deposit market. The bank’s sources of funds at this time are: interest and
principal on working capital loans, (1 + Rt + Ra
t)Sw
t , plus interest and principal on entre-
preneurial loans extended in the previous period, (1 + Re
t)Bt, p l u st h er e s e r v e si tr e c e i v e d
from households at the start of the period, At, plus newly created time and savings deposits,
Tt + Dm
t+1, plus loans on the interbank loan market, Ft. Its uses of funds include new loans,
Bt+1, extended to entrepreneurs, plus principal and interest payments on demand deposits,
(1 + Ra
t)Dt, plus interest and principal on saving deposits, (1 + Rm
t )Dm
t , plus principal and





Tt−1, plus gross expenses on labor and capital services,





Ft, on interbank loans. Thus, the bank’s net source of










t)Bt + At + Tt + D
m
t+1 + Ft − Bt+1 − (1 + R
a
t)Dt






































































In solving its problem, the bank takes rates of return and factor prices as given. In addition,
Bt+1 is determined by the considerations spelled out in the previous subsection, and so here
{Bt+1} is also taken as given as well. At date t, the bank takes Dm
t ,T t−1 as given, and
chooses Sw
t ,D m
t+1,T t,A t,K b
t,l b
t,F t,E r
t. The constraints are (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12)
and (13).
2.5 Households
There is a continuum of households, indexed by j ∈ (0,1). Households consume, save and
supply a diﬀerentiated labor input. They set their wages using the variant of the Calvo
(1983) frictions described in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000). We ﬁrst describe the
household utility function and budget constraint. We then discuss the household’s wage
setting problem.
The sequence of decisions by the jth household during a period are as follows. First,
the current period aggregate shocks are realized. Second, the household purchases state-
contingent securities whose payoﬀ is contingent upon whether it can reoptimize its wage
decision. Third, it sets its wage rate after ﬁnding out whether it can reoptimize or not.
Fourth, the household supplies the labor that is demanded at its posted wage rate. In
addition, the household makes its consumption and portfolio decisions. In the analysis below,
we do not index the consumption and portfolio decisions by j, because the state contingent
securities guarantee that, in equilibrium these decisions are the same for all households (see,
Erceg, Henderson and Levin, 2000).


























t is the expectation operator, conditional on aggregate and household j idiosyncratic
information up to, and including, time t; Ct denotes time t consumption; and hjt denotes time
t hours worked; τc is a tax on consumption; ζc,t is an exogenous shock to time t preferences;
and χt is a money demand shock. In order to help assure that our model has a balanced
growth path, we specify that u is the natural logarithm. When b>0, (15) allows for habit
formation in consumption preferences. The term in square brackets captures the notion
that currency, Mt, savings deposits, Dm
t , and household demand deposits, Dh
t , contribute
to utility by providing transactions services. The value of those services are an increasing
function of the level of consumption expenditures (inclusive of consumption tax, τc). Finally,






We now discuss the household’s period t uses and sources of funds. The household begins
the period holding the monetary base, Mb
t. It divides this between currency, Mt, and deposits
at the bank, At subject to:
M
b
t − (Mt + At) ≥ 0. (16)
In exchange for At, the household receives a demand deposit, Dh
t , from the bank. Thus,
Dh
t = At. Demand deposits pay Ra
t and also oﬀer transactions services.
The period t money injection is Xt. This is transferred to the household, so that by the
end of the period the household is in possession of Mt+Xt units of currency. We assume that
the household’s period t currency transactions services are a function of Mt only, and not
Xt, because Xt arrives ‘too late’ to be useful in current period transactions. In this way, this
timing assumption resembles the ‘cash in advance’ assumption emphasized by Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997). We make a similar assumption about demand deposits. At some point later in
the period, the household is in possession of not just Dh
t , but also the deposits that it receives
from wage payments. We assume that the household only enjoys transactions services on
Dh
t , and that the other deposits come in ‘too late’ to generate transactions services for the
household.
13The household also can acquire savings and time deposits, Dm
t+1 and Tt, respectively.
These can be acquired at the end of the period t goods market and pay rates of return,
1+Rm
t+1 and 1+RT
t+1 at the end of the period t +1goods market. The household can use
its funds to pay for consumption goods, (1 + τc)PtCt and to acquire high powered money,
Mb
t+1, for use in the following period.
Sources of funds include after-tax wage payments,
¡
1 − τl¢
Wj,thj,t, where Wj,t is the
household’s wage rate; proﬁts, Π, from producers of capital, banks and intermediate good
ﬁrms; and Aj,t. T h el a t t e ri st h en e tp a y o ﬀ on the state contingent securities that the house-
hold purchases to insulate itself from uncertainty associated with being able to reoptimize
its wage rate. In addition, households receive lump-sum transfers, 1 − Θ, corresponding to
the net worth of the 1 − γt entrepreneurs who exit the economy the current period. Also,
the household pays a lump-sum tax, We
t , to ﬁnance the transfer payments made to the γt
entrepreneurs that survive and to the 1 − γt newly born entrepreneurs. Finally, the house-
































Wj,thj,t + Mt + Πt + Aj,t − M
b
t+1 ≥ 0.







lt, 1 ≤ λw, (18)
where lt is the quantity of homogeneous labor employed by goods-producing intermediate
good ﬁrms and banks, Wt i st h ew a g er a t eo fh o m o g e n e o u sl a b o r ,a n dWj,t is the jth house-
hold’s wage. Homogeneous labor is thought of as being provided by competitive labor con-
tractors who use the production function, (4). The jth household is the monopoly supplier
of diﬀerentiated labor of type hj,t. In a given period the jth household can optimize its wage
rate, Wj,t, with probability, 1 − ξw. With probability ξw it cannot reoptimize, in which case
















t is the target inﬂation rate of the monetary authority and ¯ π is a constant which
is sometimes set to the steady state inﬂation rate. The parameters in this equation satisfy
0 ≤ ιw,1,ι w,2, 1 − ιw,1 − ιw,2 ≤ 1.
The household’s problem is to maximize (15) subject to the various non-negativity, the
demand for labor, the Calvo wage-setting frictions, and (17). The equilibrium conditions
associated with the household problem are derived in the appendix.
2.6 Monetary Policy





t−1 +( 1− ρi){π
∗
t + απ [Et (πt+1) − π
∗
t]+αyˆ yt + αMg3t} + εt, (20)
where the constant term has been deleted. The monetary authority’s target inﬂation rate,
π∗






We model the inﬂation target as a stochastic process with high persistence. The notion
that the inﬂation target is a slowly-moving variable is consistent with the ﬁndings of several
recent empirical analyses of monetary policy.9
In (20), ˆ yt denotes the log deviation from steady state of aggregate GDP, yt, deﬁned in
the usual way as the sum of consumption, investment and government spending. Also, g3t is
the growth rate of ‘broad money’, deﬁned as the sum of M1t and savings deposits, Dm
t .W e
deﬁne M1t as currency, Mt, plus demand deposits, Dt. Finally, εt in (20) denotes a monetary
policy shock, which we assume is uncorrelated over time.
2.7 Resource Constraint
We now develop the aggregate resource constraint for our model economy. Clearing in the

























9See, Gerlach and Svensson (2001), Adolfson, Laseen, Linde, and Villani (2004) and
Schorfheide (2005).
15The ﬁr s to b j e c ti n( 2 1 )r e p r e s e n t st h eq u a n t i t yo fﬁnal output used up by banks in moni-
toring entrepreneurs. The second term captures capital utilization costs.10 The third term
corresponds to the consumption of the 1−γt entrepreneurs who exit the economy in period




where gt is a stationary stochastic process. By expressing Gt as a stationary fraction of z∗
t,
we help to ensure that the model has a balanced growth path. The last term on the left of
the equality in the goods clearing condition is the amount of ﬁnal goods used up in producing
It investment goods.
2.8 Fundamental Shocks











t is the central bank’s inﬂation objective, xb
t is a technology shock in the bank pro-
duction function; μΥ,t is an investment-speciﬁc technology shock; gt is a shock to government
consumption; μz∗,t is the permanent, neutral technology shock; γt is the entrepreneurial sur-
vival probability shock; εt i sam o n e t a r yp o l i c ys h o c k ; t is the stationary, neutral shock to
technology; σt is the shock to the risk of entrepreneurs’ activities; ζc,t i sad i s c o u n tr a t es h o c k
in households’ utility function; ζi,t is a shock to the production function for new capital;
and τoil
t is the price of oil (which shocks the cost of capital utilization); λf,t is a shock to the
elasticity of demand for intermediate goods (i.e., a price-markup shock). Finally, σℵ,t is a
shock in the term structure equation. Here,




We constructed a 15 × 1 vector st from St as follows. With one exception, if Sit is the
ith element of St, and Si is its mean value, then sit =( Sit − Si)/Si, for i =1 ,..., 15. The
exceptional case is s9,t and S9t (i.e., this corresponds to εt, the monetary policy shock). In
this case, s9,t = S9,t. We assume that st is a ﬁrst order vector autoregression:
st = Ps t−1 + ut,E u tu
0
t = D, (23)
10Here, we use the fact that an entrepreneur’s rate of utilization, ut, is independent of
the draw of ω. In addition, we use the fact that the integral of ω across entrepreneurs is
unity.
16where P and D are diagonal matrices.
We are able to work with a large range of shocks because we use a large number of
variables in our analysis (see section 2.10 below). Because it is important to our analysis
that we get the shocks right, we place as few constraints as possible on the set of shocks the
data can choose from. One shock that often appears in economic analyses, but which is not
included here, is a disturbance to the disutility of labor. Originally we included this shock
in our model, but we dropped it when we found that it contributes essentially nothing to
model ﬁt. For a complete analysis of the estimation results for our model, see Christiano,
Motto and Rostagno (2007).
2.9 Adjustment Cost Functions
The adjustment costs in investment are modeled as follows:


























and I/I−1 denotes the steady state growth rate of investment.
We adopt the following utilization cost function:
a(u)=0 .5bσau
2 + b(1 − σa)u + b((σa/2) − 1),
where b is selected so that u =1in steady state and σa ≥ 0 is a parameter that controls the
degree of convexity of costs.
2.10 Solution and Estimation
We solved the model by log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions about steady state, using
the strategy in Christiano (2002). There are 29 endogenous variables whose values are
determined at time t, and these are contained in a 29 × 1 vector denoted Zt. Given values
for the parameters of the model, we compute steady state values for each variable in Zt. We
then construct the 29 × 1 vector, zt as follows. If Zit is the ith element of Zt and Zi is the
corresponding steady state, then the ith element of zt is zit =( Zit−Zi)/Zi. Given the shocks
described in the previous section, we can write the equilibrium conditions in the following
form:
Et [α0zt+2 + α1zt+1 + α2zt + β0st+1 + β1st]=0 ,
17where αi are 29×29 matrices, i =0 ,1,2, and βi are 29×15 matrices, i =0 ,1. The solution
to this system, which takes into account the law of motion of the shocks, (23), is:
zt = Azt−1 + Bst, (24)
where A is a 29 × 29 matrix with eigenvalues less than unity and B is a 29 × 15 matrix.
The variables in zt are chosen partly for computational convenience, and not at all with
the variables in mind that we use in estimation. The 15 variables used in estimation are:
Xt =
⎛















∆log(per capita real It)
∆log(M1t)
∆log(broad moneyt)
















t is the 10-year government bond rate.11 For both the EA and US models, we
measure Nt+1/Pt by the value of the Dow Jones Industrial average, scaled by the GDP
deﬂator. For the US, the external ﬁnance premium is measured by the diﬀerence between
BAA and AAA yield on corporate bonds. For the EA it is measured using the spread
between, on the one hand, banks’ lending rates and on the other hand, corporate bonds
yields and government bonds of similar maturity. Here, the weights used to aggregate rates
of return correspond to outstanding amounts. For the US, we measure broad money using
M2t and for the EA we measure broad money using M3t. For both the US and the EA, we
measure inﬂation, πt, using the GDP deﬂator. The interest rate, Re
t, is measured for the
US by the Federal Funds rate and for the EA it is the short-term interest rate taken from
11In the case of the US the bond is issued by the US Federal government and in the case
of the EA, the bond corresponds to a weighted average of member country government
bonds.
18the Area Wide Model dataset described in Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2001). The interest
rate, Ra
t, is measured in the US as the own rate of return on M2 (as reported on FRED,
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ data website) and in the EA it is measured as the
r a t eo no v e r n i g h td e p o s i t s . I nt h ec a s eo fh o u r sw o r k e d ,f o rt h eU Sw eu s et h eB u r e a uo f
Labor Statistics’ Nonfarm Business Sector Index, Hours of All Persons. For the EA, we use
the hours worked data provided by the Groenigen database. In the case of wages, for the
US we use compensation per hour in the nonfarm business sector provided by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics and for the EA we use the data on compensation from the Area Wide
Model dataset. The sample period used in the estimation is 1983Q2-2006Q2. We use this
rather short sample because of data limitations in the EA and because we want to preserve
comparability between the US and the EA results. In addition, by using this sample period,
we minimize the impact of various structural breaks that are said to have occured in the
early 1980s.12
The model’s implication for R10
t is based on the model’s ﬁrst order condition for a 10-year
nominally risk free rate of interest. For more details on these and other variables in Xt, see
Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2007).
To derive our model’s implications for Xt, we log-linearize the mapping from Xt to zt
and st :
Xt = α + τzt + τ
sst +¯ τzt−1. (26)
The real oil price in our model corresponds to τoil
t , discussed in section 2.3. Equations (23),
(24) and (26) represent a complete description of the joint (linearized) distribution of the
variables, Xt. We estimate the parameters using standard Bayesian maximum likelihood
methods.
3 T h eE Aa n dU Si nt h e2 0 0 1R e c e s s i o n
This section reports our analysis of the EA and US experiences in the 2001 recession. The
ﬁrst subsection discusses our estimates of the parameters governing the monetary policy rules
of the ECB and the Fed. We show that, because ECB monetary policy is characterized by
greater persistence, monetary policy shocks have a much bigger impact on the EA economy
than on the US economy. The second subsection discusses the diﬀerent shocks that drove
the EA and the US in the 2001 recession. This section shows that monetary policy shocks
generated by the ECB had a cumulative eﬀect of increasing output by 17 percent in the
EA. The analogous number for the US is only 3 percent. The notion that by comparison
with the Fed, the ECB stood by passively as the economy languished in the 2001 recession
12That is, a possible break in monetary policy and the ‘Great Moderation’, the apparent
decline in macroeconomic volatility.
19is hard to reconcile with these ﬁndings. The third subsection helps document our point that
an important reason for the diﬀerent inﬂation, interest rate and GDP outcomes in the US
and the EA had to do with the shocks that they experienced. The fourth subsection asks
how the EA data would have evolved after 1999 if wages and prices in the EA had been set
as in the US. We ﬁnd that diﬀerences in wage and price setting in the two regions goes a
long way in explaining the diﬀerences in inﬂation and policy outcomes, although they have
l i t t l et od ow i t ht h ed i ﬀerent GDP outcomes. The ﬁnal subsection suggests that if the Fed
policy rule had been used in the EA, output would have been lower and inﬂation, higher.
3 . 1 M o n e t a r yP o l i c yR u l e s
The Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2007) estimates of the parameters of the Fed and ECB
monetary policy rules, (20), are:
US: ρi =0 .82,α π =1 .93, αy =0 .17,α M =0
EA: ρi =0 .91,α π =1 .58, αy =0 .19,α M =0 .031.
S e v e r a lt h i n g sa r ew o r t hn o t i n g .F i r s t ,t h eE C B ’ sm o n e t a r yp o l i c yr u l ee x h i b i t sm o r ei n e r t i a
than the Fed’s. We explore the consequences of this further, below. Second, the two central
banks’ responses to inﬂation are diﬀerent. At the same time, the diﬀerence is probably
overstated by the fact that the ECB is also estimated to respond to M3 growth, a variable
that is presumably positively correlated with inﬂation. Third, both central banks respond
about equally to output.
To understand the consequences of our monetary policy rules for the eﬀects of the iid
monetary policy shocks, εt, consider Figure 5. It displays the dynamic eﬀects on output,
consumption, investment, the interest rate, inﬂation and hours worked of a shock to monetary
policy. In both cases, the shock represents roughly a 22 basis point negative, iid, shock to
the interest rate. Note that the response of consumption, output, investment and hours
is much stronger in the EA model than in the US model. The policy shock leads to 0.9
and 0.3 percent cumulative increases in real GDP within the ﬁr s ty e a ri nt h eE Aa n dU S ,
respectively. The analogous ﬁgures for investment are 1.61 and 0.33 percent, respectively.
The ﬁgure shows that when the ECB policy persistence (or, inertia) parameter, ρi, is set to
the Fed’s value, then the diﬀerence between the US and the Fed’s impulse response functions
falls substantially.
Later, we report that our estimate of the degree of price stickiness in the EA is greater
than what it is for the US. Figure 5 displays the impulse response functions when the EA’s
price stickiness parameter is replaced by the US’s. Note that this change makes very little
diﬀerence. Other diﬀerences in price and wage setting parameters (see below) also have little
impact on the impulse response functions in Figure 5. The key parameter accounting for the
pronounced diﬀerence in impulse response functions is the persistence parameter, ρi.
20The dynamic impact of unexpected monetary policy innovations on output and inﬂation
that are reported in Figure 5 are broadly in line with existing evidence based on identiﬁed
VAR analysis for the US and the EA. For instance, Peersman and Smets (2003) ﬁnd that
the eﬀect of a monetary policy shock on real activity is much more persistent in the EA than
in the US, so that the cumulative response is stronger in the EA.13
3.2 Shocks
This section establishes two results. First, the shocks driving the 2001 recession in the EA
and the US economies diﬀered in terms of their timing and nature. The shocks that pushed
the US into recession hit almost a year before the ones that produced the recession in the EA.
Also, in the EA technology shocks followed the usual negative pattern during the recession,
while the US experienced favorable supply shocks in almost every quarter of the recession.
Second, our estimates indicate that as soon as recession-producing shocks struck, each central
bank deviated from its normal policy rule in a way that, while maintaining inﬂation under
control, had the eﬀect of supporting real economic activity. The contribution of monetary
policy shocks to output was greater in the EA than in the US.
There are too many shocks in our model to study the individual role of each one on the
post-2000 data. To keep the analysis manageable, we organize our ﬁfteen shocks into six
broad categories. The ‘Goods Technology’ category is composed of the technology shocks
aﬀecting the production of the ﬁnal output good, Yt. The ‘Capital producers and Entrepre-
neurs’ category is composed of shocks that aﬀect the demand and supply of capital. On the
demand side, we include all the shocks that aﬀect the entrepreneurs: the oil shock, τoil
t , the
riskiness shock, σt, and the asset valuation shock, γt. On the supply side, we include the
shocks that aﬀect the producers of capital: the marginal eﬃciency of investment shock, ζit,
and the shock to the price of investment goods, μΥ,t. Two of these shocks, γt and ζit, are
particularly important in the dynamics of the stock market, which we identify with entre-
preneurial net worth. The ‘Demand’ category includes the shock to government spending,
as well as to the preference for current utility. The ‘Banking and Money Demand’ category
includes the two shocks perturbing households’ demand for and banks’ provision of inside
money. The ‘Monetary policy’ category contains the high frequency disturbance to monetary
policy, εt. Finally, the inﬂation objective is in its own category. The six groups of shocks
13We refer, in particular, to their model speciﬁcation including M3. However, they ﬁnd
that the peak eﬀect of a monetary policy shock on real economic activity is similar in the
EA and the US.
21a r es u m m a r i z e da sf o l l o w s : 14
Goods supply: λft,  t,μ
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t ,γ t,σ t
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A by product of our estimation strategy is a time series of ﬁtted shocks. A property of
these shocks is that, when they are fed simultaneously to our estimated model, the simulated
Xt (see (25)) coincides exactly with the actual data. Thus, because of the linearity of our
approximation of the model’s solution, the shocks provide us with an additive decomposition
of the data. The decomposition of the (demeaned, year-over-year, percent) growth rate of
GDP in the 2001 recession for the US and the EA appears in Figures 6 and 7, respectively.
Consider the US results ﬁrst. Note how the primary shocks responsible for the recession
are a combination of demand shocks and shocks to capital producers and entrepreneurs. Be-
ginning in 2000Q1, the ﬁrst in a string of negative demand shocks occurs, and these are later
reinforced by negative shocks from capital producers and entrepreneurs. Interestingly, while
technology shocks become smaller during the recession, they remain positive in each quar-
ter, with the exception of 2001Q3 and Q4. Thereafter, technology shocks become stronger
and help bring the recession to an end. Regarding monetary policy, we can see that the
Fed deviated from its monetary policy rule in a way that supported output as the economy
began to weaken in 2000, and then deviated much more strongly as the recession began to
unfold in earnest in 2001. We estimate that monetary policy shocks contributed at least
one-half percent to GDP growth in each of the 4 quarters from 2001Q2 to 2002Q2. On
average, monetary policy shocks contributed 0.75 percentage points over these four quarters,
for a cumulative eﬀect of roughly 3 percent of GDP. The sequence of expansionary monetary
policy shocks came to an end in the beginning of 2002, when the strong positive technology
shocks took over and drove the economy out of recession.
Now consider the EA in Figure 7. Note how the growth in the EA does not begin to
weaken until the end of 2000, almost a year after the start of the US recession. As in the
US, the recession is attributed primarily to a combination of demand shocks and shocks
to capital producers and entrepreneurs. Unlike the US, unfavorable technology shocks also
contributed to the recession. When the recession got underway, the ECB deviated from
i t sn o r m a lm o n e t a r yp o l i c yr u l e .I td i ds oo v e ra ne x t e n d e dp e r i o d ,a n dw i t hc o n s i d e r a b l e
14A ﬁfteenth shock, σℵ,t, is not included here, because it has no impact on the alloca-
tions.
22eﬀect. Monetary policy shocks added more than one-half percent to growth in each of the 13
quarters from 2001Q4 to 2004Q4. On average, it contributed 1.27 percent to GDP growth
over these 13 quarters, for a cumulative eﬀect of 17 percent of GDP.
3.3 Swapping Shocks
Figure 8 indicates that if the EA had been hit by the US shocks, it would have fallen into
the recession sooner than it actually did (see Figure 8, ‘GDP Growth (US shocks)’). The
calculations in this ﬁgure assume that the ECB follows its estimated policy rule, as well as the
estimated inﬂation target and monetary policy shocks. According to Figure 10, there would
have been a policy loosening comparable to the Fed’s, in the sense that the ECB interest rate
would eventually have been brought down to nearly the level of the Fed’s rate (see ‘Policy
Rate (US shocks)’). This policy easing, together with the favorable technology shocks, would
have produced a sharp recovery without much inﬂation (see Figure 9). On the whole, this
counterfactual resembles what happened in the US. The results support our conclusion that
diﬀerences in shocks are an important factor underlying the diﬀerent economic performance
of the EA and the US over the 2001 recession.
In comparing the US and the EA in response to the US shocks, we see that there is
one diﬀerence worth noting. The EA policy rate does not exhibit the abrupt drop we see
i nt h eU Sr a t e . T h em o r em o d e r a t er e s p o n s eo ft h eE C Br a t ei np a r tr e ﬂects the greater
persistence in the ECB monetary policy rule. We can see this in Figure 13, which shows how
the EA would have responded to US shocks, if the ECB policy rule had the Fed degree of
persistence. Note how this change creates greater volatility in the ECB policy rate (compare
‘EA policy rate (US shocks and Fed inertia)’ with ‘EA policy rate (US shocks)’). Figure 13
shows that the diﬀerent weights assigned to inﬂation in the ECB and the Fed policy rules
make very little diﬀerence to the policy rate (compare ‘EA policy rate (US shocks and Fed
inﬂation reaction)’ with ‘EA policy rate (US shocks)’). Finally, Figure 13 shows that the
Fed policy shocks are part of the explanation for the abrupt drop in the interest rate in the
wake of US shocks (compare ‘EA policy rate (US shocks and Fed policy innovations)’ with
‘EA policy rate (US shocks)’).
3.4 Swapping Structures
Among the parameters governing the dynamics of the model, the biggest diﬀerences between
the EA and the US concern the parameters that govern the setting of wages and prices. Our
estimates for the two regions are as follows:
US: ξp =0 .63,ξ w =0 .80,ι 1 =0 .16,ι w1 =0 .86
EA: ξp =0 .81,ξ w =0 .83,ι 1 =0 .70,ι w1 =0 .79.
23Consistent with conventional wisdom, we ﬁnd that prices are more ﬂexible in the US than in
t h eE A .T h er i g i d i t yo fw a g e si sr o u g h l yt h es a m ea c r o s st h eE Aa n dt h eU S .T h ei n d e x a t i o n
of prices to the central bank’s inﬂation target is very diﬀerent in the two regions. This may
be a consequence of the fact that the ECB is more explicit than the Fed about its inﬂation
objective.15
According to Figure 8, GDP growth in the EA would have been roughly what it actually
was if the EA had been characterized by the US wage and price-setting parameters (compare
‘GDP growth (US structure)’ with ‘EA Actual GDP growth’). Although diﬀerences in
structure do not help explain diﬀerences in growth outcomes, they do account for a good
part of the diﬀerence in inﬂation and the interest rate. Note from Figure 9 that inﬂation in
the EA would have been even more volatile than it was in the US, if the EA had had the
US wage and price setting parameters. It is then perhaps not surprising, turning to Figure
10, that the EA policy rate would have been more volatile too (though, still somewhat less
volatile that the actual US rate).
3.5 Swapping Policy Rules
Our experiments suggest that if the ECB had followed the Fed’s monetary policy rule and
shocks, the EA would have had lower output and higher inﬂation. According to Figure
10 (‘Policy rate (Fed rule)’), under the counterfactual experiment the ECB’s policy rate
would have been higher than the Fed’s throughout most of the 2001 recession and recovery.
Output growth in the contraction phase of the recession would not have been strongly aﬀected
(Figure 8, ‘GDP growth (Fed rule)’). However, output growth during the recovery phase
would have been more anemic than it actually was. According to Figure 9, the EA would
have experienced higher inﬂation throughout most of the 2001 recession (see ‘Inﬂation (Fed
rule)’). In short, the EA would have had higher inﬂation, higher interest rates, and lower
output growth during the expansion if it had followed the Fed’s monetary policy rule and
shocks.
In results not reported here, we investigated what it is about the Fed’s monetary policy
that produces these results. The key reason that inﬂation is higher under the counterfactual
simulation is our ﬁnding that there is a rise in the Fed’s inﬂation objective after 2002Q1.
This has a substantial impact on inﬂation in the EA in part because of our estimate that
EA price setters are quick to incorporate the inﬂation objective into their wage and price
d e c i s i o n s( s e et h eE Av a l u eo fι1 above). The higher realized inﬂation is part of the reason
that the ECB’s policy rate in the counterfactual is so high. This in turn helps to account
for the relatively anemic EA recovery in the counterfactual. Still, we found that the single
15The analysis of Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) is related to our indexation
ﬁnding. They argue that because the Fed does not announce its inﬂation objective, long-
term inﬂation expectations display excess sensitivity relative to short-term inﬂation news.
24most important factor accounting for the relatively weak EA recovery in the counterfactual
is our estimate of the Fed’s monetary policy shocks. These are smaller than the monetary
policy shocks, εt, that we estimate for the EA.
4C o n c l u s i o n
We noted in the introduction that the ECB moved its policy rate by less than the Fed did
during the 2001 recession. Our results show that this is not due to "passivity" on the side
of the ECB. Both central banks deviated from their policy rules during the 2001 recession.
The policy shocks produced by the ECB had a bigger eﬀect supporting output than did the
policy shocks produced by the Fed. The reason ECB policy shocks had a bigger eﬀect is
that the ECB’s policy rule is characterized by greater persistence. As a result, to achieve
ag i v e ne ﬀect on output, the ECB has to move its policy rate by less than the Fed. Other
reasons that policy outcomes in the EA and the US diﬀered in the 2001 recession is that the
two regions were hit by diﬀerent shocks and have diﬀerent degrees of stickiness in wages and
prices. According to our results, recession-producing shocks arrived in the US before the
EA, and this is why the Fed moved its policy rate ﬁrst. Bad shocks lingered longer in the
EA, and this is why the ECB kept its policy rate low longer. Also, wages and prices in the
EA are characterized by greater stickiness. If the degree of stickiness in the EA had been
t h es a m ea si ti si nt h eU S ,t h e ni n ﬂation would have been more volatile and so would the
realized ECB policy rate.
Our work suggests one important area for additional research. In our analysis we adopt
the standard Taylor-rule formulation of monetary policy. However, we ﬁnd that deviations
from this Taylor rule (‘monetary policy shocks’) play an important role in policy in the
2001 recession. For example, the abruptness with which the Fed reduced rates in response
to the recession is largely attributed to deviations from past behavior. ECB policy is also
characterized by a willingness to depart from the estimated simple rule postulated in the
model. We suspect that actual policy is in fact more predictable than these ﬁndings suggest.
As a result, we think there are gains to be had from exploring alternative representations of
monetary policy which assign less responsibility to shocks.
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Inflation in US and Euro Area
US Federal Funds Rate
ECB Policy Rate
US Per Capita GDP
Euro Area GDP
US CPI Inflation
Euro Area HICP InflationFIGURE 2: One Period in the Life of an Entrepreneur 
* End of period t: Using net worth, 
Nt+1, and loans, entrepreneur 
purchases new, end-of-period stock 
of capital from capital goods 
producers. Entrepreneur observes 
idiosyncratic disturbance to its 
newly purchased capital.
After realization of period
t+1 shocks, entrepreneur 
decides on capital utilization 
rate.
Entrepreneur supplies 
capital services to 





capital to capital 
producers
Entrepreneur pays 
off debt to bank, 
determines current 
net  worth. 
If entrepreneur survives 
another period, goes 
back to *. 
Otherwise, entrepreneur 
consumes fraction of net 
worth and exits 
economy 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































EA with Fed inertia
EA with US price stickiness
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